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In this paper, I investigate the effect of the takeover of a Slovak petroleum firm on its price 
setting mechanism. In particular, I tested the changes in the reaction of output (fuel) price 
on input (dollar and crude oil) prices and competitors’ prices (approximated by the 
reference Commodity Exchange fuel price). I find that during the time when the company 
was owned and controlled by managers, only negative changes in input prices were 
reflected in the output price. After the takeover of the firm by a foreign strategic investor, I 
identify a different price setting mechanism: the fuel price starts to react symmetrically to 
the input prices. The fuel price, however, reacts asymmetrically to the competitors’ prices. 
In particular, the fuel price reacts to Brent increases and Gasoline decreases. Consecutive 
regression confirmed the hypothesis that before takeover the composite input costs and 
competitors’ prices have very little (or no) impact on fuel price. After takeover, composite 
input costs as well as competitors’ prices start to play an important role in price setting. 
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Cílem této práce je vyšetřit vliv převzetí Slovenské rafinérie na její cenový mechanizmus. 
Testuji změnu reakce ceny konečného produktu (benzínu) na ceny vstupních surovin (kurz 
dolaru a cena ropy) a konkurenčních výrobců (aproximované referenční cenou benzínu na 
komoditní burze). Ukazuje se, že pokud byla rafinérie vlastněna managementem, cena 
konečného výrobku reagovala jenom na pokles cen ropy. Po převzetí firmy zahraničním 
strategickým investorem můžeme identifikovat jiný cenový mechanizmus, kdy cena 
benzínu začíná reagovat symetricky na změny cen vstupních surovin. Cena benzínu však 
reagovala nesymetricky na změny cen konkurenčních prodejců. Cena benzínu reagovala 
zejména na zvýšení ceny ropy a snížení ceny benzínu kótovaného na burze. Následná 
regrese potvrdila hypotézu, že před převzetím firmy neměly celkové vstupní náklady a 
ceny konkurentů téměř žádný vliv na cenu benzínu. Po převzetí začaly celkové vstupní 
náklady i ceny konkurentů hrát důležitou roli při cenotvorbě. 
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During the latest crisis in the crude oil market in 1999–2000, prices of crude oil reached 
levels of 35 USD per gallon. The weakening of the Euro against the U.S. dollar made the 
situation even worse. Prices of fuel rose to levels where the general public and political 
parties lost their patience and start to blame everyone and everything for the situation. 
Prices at gas stations became almost an integral part of the evening news all over Europe. 
All parts of the fuel production chain were condemned: OPEC countries for low 
production, refineries for asymmetric price reaction, governments for high taxes, and local 
gas stations for cartel behavior.  
The general public in Slovakia claimed to observe an asymmetric relationship 
between fuel and oil prices – specifically that fuel prices respond when oil prices are rising 
but not when they are falling. The same holds for the response to the rise and the fall of the 
dollar. In this paper I want to test the symmetricity of these relationships and the price 
setting mechanism in general in the context of ownership change — from managerial to 
strategic foreign partner. However, this paper does not attempt to address how asymmetry 
might arise. 
In particular, I want to examine the effect of the strategic foreign partner on the 
price setting mechanism of the Slovak petroleum company Slovnaft. I want to study the 
interactions between the input and output prices during two distinct periods. The first 
period was when the company was owned by the managers. The second period started 
when the company was taken over by the foreign strategic investor. Dividing the dataset 
into these two samples will allow me to identify changes in the price setting mechanism. 
The asymmetric transmission of oil prices on fuel prices and the fuel market have 
been tested in Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg (2000) and Eltony (1998), among others. 
Bacon (1991) found asymmetry in the U.K. fuel market; Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert   3
(1997) found the same evidence for the U.S. market. Peltzman (2000) made a 
comprehensive study of price transmission using large samples of diverse products. He 
finds no asymmetry in the response of an individual decision maker (a supermarket chain) 
to its costs, but he finds above-average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a 
fragmented wholesale distribution system. 
None of these studies examined price transmission in the context of ownership. 
One of the few exemptions is Contin, Correlje and Huerta (1999). They examine the 
evolution of the Spanish gasoline market from the abolition of the state oil monopoly to 
"complete" liberalization.  
In their papers, researchers determine the features of the transmission mechanism 
by using different econometric approaches. Cramon-Taubadel and Meyer (2000) offer a 
nice overview. The first approach, the oldest one, is based on Houck (1977) where he 
desegregates the price variables into increasing and decreasing phases. He was followed 
by Bailey and Brorsen (1989) and Mohanty, Peterson and Kruse (1995), among others. 
The second approach uses the asymmetric error correction model. This approach is 
motivated by the fact that the variables in the Houck specification are in differences and, 
therefore, they ignore the information that is reflected in their levels. Examples of these 
studies could be Engle and Granger (1987) or Granger and Lee (1989). The third approach 
is the threshold (or momentum) cointegration approach. This approach can be superior to 
earlier ones when the price series in question is cointegrated. Examples are Abdulai and 
Reider (1999) and Harper and Goodwin (1999). 
An example of the second approach in the context of the fuel market could be 
Adrangi, Chatrath and Ripple (2001). They analyze the price dynamics of Alaska North 
Slope crude oil and Los Angeles diesel fuel prices. They employ VAR methodology and a 
bivariate GARCH model to show that there is strong evidence of a uni-directional causal   4
relationship between the two prices. They conclude that the Alaska North Slope crude oil 
price is the driving force of changes in the Los Angeles diesel price. Borenstein, Cameron 
and Gilbert (1997) or Bake, Brown and Yucel (1996) use an error-correction model to 
model asymmetry, estimate variance decomposition, and the response function of a one-
time shock in oil price. 
The limitation of the second and third approaches is that they require sufficiently 
long data series to give reliable results. Bake, Brown and Yucel (1996), for example, use 
weekly data counting more than 1500 observations. My data set counts for only 114 
observations, hence my decision regarding econometric approach is rather limited and the 
standard Houck approach is therefore my choice. 
Cramon-Taubadel and Meyer (2000) points to the issue that can have a substantial 
impact on the identification of price asymmetry. They show that in the presence of a 
structural break in symmetrically - linked price data, it appears that the true size of tests for 
asymmetric price transmission is considerably larger than the chosen significance level. 
This implies that what appears to be asymmetric price transmission may in fact be due to 
other causes. Results reported later confirmed that the division of the sample into two parts 
has an impact on the results for price symmetricity. Therefore one has to take into account 
possible structural breaks, especially in transition countries. 
For the purpose of my analyses I choose the Slovak petroleum firm Slovnaft. 
Slovnaft was transformed from a state company to a joint stock company in the course of 
the first wave of privatization. Since May 1
st, 1992, all assets and liabilities of the state 
enterprise were transferred into the joint stock company together with one-third of the 
distribution network of fuels. The process of privatization was completed in several steps 
at the beginning of 1998. The majority stake was in the hands of the managerial joint stock 
company, Slovintegra; foreign investors held 33 percent of shares. Finally, Slovnaft, on   5
March 31st, 2000, signed an agreement on a strategic partnership with MOL, one of the 
biggest Hungarian corporations. 
Table 1 depicts the current shareholder structure in Slovnaft. The largest 
shareholder is Hungarian MOL with 36.22 percent, managers (represented by Slovintegra, 
a.s.) have 28.67 percent, the Bank of New York and the Fund of National Property each 
have around 8 percent and the remaining share (18.74%) is in the hands of small investors 
and investment funds. 
Slovnaft is the only big petroleum company in Slovakia. As such, it has a dominant 
position in the fuel market. The share of this single company in petroleum products retail 
is about 50 percent. The rest of the market is rather fragmented among other fuel suppliers, 
for example OMV or Transpetrol. Therefore, the prices of fuel at Slovnaft’s gas stations 
are the ones which most influence the Slovakia fuel price level. 
In this paper I look at the transmission mechanism in an ownership context from 
three different angles. The first method for examining the links among input and output 
prices is Granger causality. The second method is the calculation of the correlation matrix 
of all input and output price variables. These will show to what extent the prices of input 
factors tend to move with output prices. The last method is the estimation of regression 
equations, which identify sources of output price changes and examine the importance of 
these factors under different ownerships of companies. The specification will, at the same 
time, answer the dispute over the symmetricity of output price reaction to input prices. 
There are many factors which should have an influence on output prices. Examples 
could be the direct input costs which are, in case of a petroleum company, the crude oil 
price (expressed in the U.S. dollar) or the dollar price (expressed in the local currency). 
Another example could be staff cost or tax rates. I decide to choose factors which are   6
explicitly mentioned in official statements of the Slovnaft company. I have to stress that 
these factors differ during different ownership structures of the company. 
The official statement of Slovnaft discusses the reasons for fuel price changes. At 
the same time it confirms the appropriateness of the division of the sample into two 
periods. Let me quote from a press release from before the takeover period: 
We can reflect only legitimate costs into our prices. …In our case besides the 
price of Crude oil as a global factor, also a local factor plays an important role 
– the exchange rate of the Slovak crown against the USD. We buy Russian 
crude oil for dollars. At the end of 1999, the price of crude oil significantly fell, 
but on the other hand the Slovak crown exhibited weakening against the dollar. 
(Slovnaft 2000a) 
 
Clearly there are two reasons for fuel price increases: crude oil price and the Slovak 
crown. Shortly after the takeover, the reasoning for fuel price changes was a bit different: 
In accordance with the oil price development of Brent crude oil on the London 
Exchange, the listed prices of gasoline and motor oil on the Commodity 
Exchange and together with a weakening of the Slovak crown exchange rate 
against the USD, Slovnaft, a.s. has adjusted the retail price of motor fuels in 
own gas station network since September 9th, 2000. (Slovnaft 2000b) 
 
We can see that besides crude oil price and the Slovak crown, there is a new 
additional factor — the price of gasoline on New York Commodity Exchange. 
In order to distinguish the retail price of Slovnaft’s fuel from the corresponding 
price on the Commodity Exchange, throughout the text I will refer to Slovnaft’s fuel price 
by using just the word “fuel”, and the corresponding fuel price quoted on Commodity 
Exchange by using the word “gasoline”. 
Let me devote a few lines to the gasoline price. The fact that there is a correlation 
of Slovnaft prices with other fuel prices may only mean that the prices are caused by the 
same things. This may only mean that Slovnaft is less efficient than other producers in 
incorporating raw material or other cost changes into prices.
1 I have two reasons why I 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank Prof. Filer for pointing out this issue.   7
decide to include gasoline prices into the price analysis. The first one is that the price of 
fuel on the Commodity Exchange could be considered as the price of fuel at fuel stations 
other than Slovnaft. In Slovakia, other fuel sellers have no production capacities and have 
to import all products. Thus, the prices of Slovnaft’s competitors could be concentrated 
into this variable. The second reason is that fuel’s Commodity Exchange price is explicitly 
mentioned in Slovnaft’s statements which describe the reasons for fuel price changes.  
For the purposes of this paper I choose three different techniques: correlation 
matrix, Granger causality and running regressions. I find that during the time when a 
company was owned and controlled by managers only negative changes in input prices 
were reflected into the output price. Therefore, the increases in fuel price during that 
period have different reasons than the input price. After take-over, we have different 
results. One of the most important factors is the price of the U.S. dollar in terms of the 
Slovak crown, which reacts symmetrically. This is in line with the result of Asplund, 
Eriksson and Friberg (2000). They also find that the price of Swedish fuel responds more 
rapidly to the exchange rate than other factors, though the question of speed is not present 
in my analysis. Fuel price, however, reacts asymmetrically to the prices of gasoline. 
Namely, fuel reacts to Brent increases and gasoline decreases. However, I was not able to 
reject the F-test for the symetricity of the Brent reaction. The second regression 
specification confirmed the hypothesis that before takeover the composite input costs and 
the gasoline price have very little (or no) impact on the fuel price. After takeover, 
composite input costs as well as gasoline start to play import role in price setting. The R-
squared of the second specification (input factors are aggregated) is 0.44 while the 
decomposition of input factors (into their positive and negative parts) increased R-squared 
to 0.66.   8
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the second section I present 
the methodology for testing the presence of Granger causality and the specification of 
regression equations. In section three I describe the data. Section four is devoted to 
empirical results. A brief conclusion is at the end. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Granger causality 
The interactions between input and output prices before and after takeover interest me. In 
particular, I intended to study the linkages between output price and factors which could 
influence it—crude oil, the dollar and gasoline price. The common way for studying 
interactions and linkages between variables is the well-known Granger causality. The 
intuition behind Granger causality is the following: Variable X Granger-causes variable Y 
if past values of X help to predict the current value of Y.  
Granger causality is defined as follows: Let Xt, Yt be two stationary time series with 
zero means. A simple causal model can be as follows: 
  t t t t Y L B X L A X            ( 1 )  
  t t t t Y L D X L C Y     , 
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Variables  t,  t are taken to be two uncorrelated white-noise series, i.e. E[ts] = 0 = 
E[ts], s  t, and E[ts]=0 all t, s. The Granger definition of causality implies that Xt 
causes Yt provided that C(L) 0. Similarly, Yt causes Xt if B(L) 0.  
Since the introduction of Granger causality in Granger (1969) there has been 
extensive research on the selection of lag length. There exist many lag-selection criteria, 
and, as Batten and Thornton (1985) claim, different lag selection criteria can result in   9
different conclusions. In my paper I used the Hsiao (1981) two-stage procedure and 
Hannan-Quinn criterion suggested in Hannan & Quinn (1979) and Quinn (1980).  
 
2.2. Regression specification 
In the introduction I mentioned reasons for sample division (before and after takeover) and 
potential factors for fuel price changes. Moreover, I put the question of symetricity in 
front. For the examination of all these issues I use two regression specifications. The first 
specification adopts the approach of Houck (1977) where the test for asymmetric price 
transmission is based on the segmentation of price variables into increasing and decreasing 
phases. Its purpose is to examine all sources of output price changes and the existence of 
symmetricity. On the other hand, the purpose of the second regression is, based on the 
results from the first, to assess the change in importance of total input cost and 
competitors’ fuel price (represented by gasoline price) on Slovnaft pricing. 
The first regression specification is the following: 
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where   t t O , 0 max O   
 ,  t t t O O O     
  , 
 t t D , 0 max D   
 ,  t t t D D D     
  ,  
 t t G G   
 , 0 max ,  t t t G G G     
  , 
t F  is the change in the price of the fuel,  t O  is the change in Oil price,  t D   is the 
change in the price of the dollar, and  t G   is the change in the price of gasoline on the 
Commodity Exchange. By changes I mean the first logarithmic differences of variables in 
their level values, e.g.     1 t t t F ln F ln F     . This transformation will also ensure the 
stationarity of the series and, at the same time, is a very close approximation of the growth 
rates.   10
This specification has three advantages. First, it will enable me to filter out the effect 
of a one-time price change not caused by the Slovnaft company. Such an event can be, for 
example, a change in the consumption tax on fuel. Second, the estimated coefficients will 
be the fuel price elasticities with respect to the particular input price. In other words, a 
one-percent increase in the price of the dollar in terms of the Slovak crown should cause a 
1   percent increase in fuel price. The third advantage lies in the separation of the positive 
changes from negative ones. This separation will allow me to test for symmetricity of 
coefficients, namely whether a one percent increase in input price has the same effect on 
output price as a one percent drop. Formally, I will test these hypotheses: 
0 : 0 : 2 1
'
0 2 1 0          H H for the oil price changes, 
                           0 : 0 : 2 1
'
1 2 1 1          H H     for the dollar price changes, 
                and     0 : 0 : 2 1 2 2 1 2          H H   for the gasoline price changes. 
The second specification determines the importance of the total input costs and 
gasoline price on fuel price changes, again in an ownership context. Basically, I put on one 
side the input material cost (Brent and dollar price) and competitors’ fuel price (gasoline) 
on the other side and try to find out which one is more important for Slovnaft’s price 
decision making.  The regression is as follows: 








1 1 2 1        (3) 
where  t t t D F TIC *
1   if time<time of takeover, 0 otherwise; 
           t t t D F TIC *
2   if time>time of takeover, 0 otherwise; 
          t F  is the change in the price of fuel; and  t G   is the change in the price of gasoline 
on the Commodity Exchange. TO is a dummy variable which has a value 1 after takeover 
and 0 otherwise. The TIC variable represents total input costs and is defined as the price of   11
one gallon of Brent crude oil expressed in Slovak crowns.
2 Because of same reasons stated 
above, by changes I mean the first logarithmic differences.  
Using the price of Brent and its derivative product—gasoline—causes a 
multicollinearity problem. A possible way to overcome the multicollinearity in the 
independent variables is ridge regression. A ridge estimator of the coefficients in a linear 
model has the form 
 y X I X X b
1
r     
  
where I is the identity matrix of the order of the number of independent regressors and  is 
a positive scalar computed as suggested in Sclove (1973) and described in Amemiya 




3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The choice of all data sources is based on the commentaries of the Slovnaft company, 
where they refer to all factors of fuel price changes and their sources. I downloaded the 
prices of Slovnaft’s fuel from the Slovnaft web site. As a reference fuel price I take the 
unleaded Natural 95, which is the most common type of fuel used by drivers. Since 
Slovnaft pays Russian crude oil prices that are fully derived from the prices of crude oil on 
the London exchange, I downloaded the prices of crude oil from the web site of IPE 
London and considered them as the prices which Slovnaft paid to Russian oil companies. 
                                                           
2 Naturally, the definition of total input costs should involve not only material costs (as I am doing), but also 
labour cost, investments and other costs. In my paper the time span is about two and a half years. This is 
quite a short period and the frequency of changes is between one and two weeks. Labour costs, for example, 
are usually set one year ahead. Therefore a jump in labour costs once in a year could have an impact on fuel 
price but this outlier would not influence regression results.    12
The price of gasoline was downloaded from the webpage of New York Commodity 
Exchange. These data sources are based on the commentaries of Slovnaft, where they refer 
to this particular institution. Another source could be the Commodity Exchange in 
Rotterdam. Both Rotterdam and New York exhibit high correlation, so the location of the 
Commodity Exchange should not play an important role. Prices of the U.S. dollar in terms 
of the Slovak crown were downloaded from the web site of National Bank of Slovakia.  
My sample starts in January 1999 when Slovnaft for the first time published its 
prices on the Internet. The sample ends in August 2001. During this period Slovnaft 
irregularly changed its prices. The average number of days between two price changes is 
before the takeover period 11.3 (st. dev. 10.02), and after takeover 6.9 (st. dev. 0.86). 
During the before-takeover period 83% of the price changes occurred on Tuesday or 
Wednesday and during the after-takeover period 90% of changes occurred on Tuesday. All 
other variables are in daily frequencies. Therefore I calculated the average of the daily 
values of these variables for the periods when the price of fuel did not change. Finally, I 
ended up with a sample whose frequency was the same as the fuel price changes. 
The evolution of fuel and gasoline prices is depicted in figure 1. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of composite input costs—the cost of 1 barrel of crude oil in terms of the Slovak 
crown—and the price of Slovnaft’s fuel in terms of Slovak crowns. From both figures we 
can see that the fuel price closely traces the input and/or gasoline prices (with one lag). 
Table 2a shows the basic statistics of growth rates of the above-mentioned time series 
(average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value). Table 2b summarizes 
cumulative changes in respective variables. 
 
   13
3.1 Correlation matrices 
The correlation matrix of input and output prices and their lagged values is in table 3. This 
matrix indicates the extent to which these variables tend to move together. The correlation 
coefficients are reported similarly to Kočenda (2001). The coefficients are reported for 
before as well as for after the takeover period to contrast the differences in their values. 
The left portion of table contains coefficients for before-takeover period, while the upper 
right portion contains the coefficients for after-takeover period.  
In general, the correlation coefficients of the current value of fuel and the lagged 
value of the input price for before the takeover period are around 0, only some values 
reach 0.3. These low values can be interpreted as a low connection between input and 
output price. 
Correlation coefficients for the after-takeover period are on average higher then 
those before takeover. This can be interpreted as the emergence of the missing connections 
between lagged input and current output prices. 
 
3.2 Granger causality 
For testing Granger causality I use the specification in equation (1). Variables Xt and Yt  
are first logarithmic differences of the examined time series. 
Table 4.1 depicts the estimated causality links among the price of fuel, the dollar 
and Brent for the before-takeover period.
3 One can see that there are no links from input to 
output prices. Contrary to expectations, there is just one link which runs from fuel to dollar 
price. This spurious result means that the fuel price helps to predict the dollar price. It is 
important that there are no links running from the dollar or Brent to the fuel price. I can 
                                                           
3 According to the official statement gasoline price should not play any role during the before-takeover 
period. Regression results which are reported later confirmed this fact. This is the reason I did not include 
gasoline price into the analyses of this period.   14
conclude that before takeover the prices of fuel did not reflect the price of the dollar or 
Brent. This finding is contrary to Slovnaft press releases.  
Table 4.2 is calculated for the period after the takeover. The company, according to 
press releases, started to include the price of gasoline on the Commodity Exchange into the 
price setting mechanism. This is why I also include gasoline into the group of variables 
under examination. The results showed the emerged links which run from the dollar and 
Brent price to the fuel price. Moreover, there are no additional (spurious) linkages as in the 
case of the before-takeover period. To conclude, using Granger causality I can claim that 
the takeover has provided the missing links in the development of the output price. 
 
3.3 Regression 
I estimated equation (2) for three samples: The first sample is the whole period with 114 
observations, the second sample covers the period before takeover (39 observations), and 
the third sample covers period after takeover (75 observations). The results from the OLS 
regression and F-tests are presented in table 5. The number of lags of independent 
variables is made on a rule of thumb, namely, I start with one lag and some coefficients 
were significant. Then I increase the number of lags to two and I find out that none of the 
coefficients is significant for any of the three samples. The same situation remains when I 
include the current values of independent variables into the equation. 
Using the price of Brent and gasoline in the same regression as the explanatory 
variables could cause a multicollinearity problem. Indeed, the correlation of these two 
variables is 0.535, which is high enough to investigate this potential effect. However, the 
decomposition of these two variables into their positive and negative parts will decrease 
the correlation of the resulting four variables to values of around 0.37. This number should   15
be low enough to ensure that the standard errors of estimated coefficients would not be 
excessively high. 
From table 5 we can see that during the whole period only the negative changes in 
input costs (dollar and Brent) are reflected in the changes of the output price (fuel). The 
same holds for the reaction of fuel to gasoline prices. In other words, increases in fuel 
prices were not caused by increases in the dollar, Brent or gasoline prices. This is an 
interesting result that can be attributed to different price setting under different ownership. 
The division of the sample into before and after takeover sheds light on the 
changes in the price-setting mechanism. Estimations for the sample covering the before-
takeover period only confirmed the results obtained for the whole period—only negative 
changes in input prices are reflected in output prices. Despite the fact that official 
statements from Slovnaft did not claim gasoline price as a factor influencing fuel price, I 
include this variable into the explanatory variables. This variable shows to be insignificant. 
Hence, increases in fuel price were not the result of increased input prices. The R squared 
of 0.3 confirmed that the price setting mechanism was not based on input prices. 
The results for the after-takeover period are interesting. The price of fuel starts to 
symmetrically react to the dollar price. A corresponding F-test did not reject the 
hypotheses of the equality of the coefficient of the positive and negative parts of the dollar 
price variable. Therefore, I can claim that fuel symmetrically reacts to the dollar. The 
elasticity is less than unity, in other words a 1 percent increase in the dollar price would 
not cause a 1 percent increase in the fuel price (rather, 0.375 percent). 
The reaction of the fuel price to the Brent price is rather different from before 
takeover. An increase in the Brent price is reflected in the fuel price, whereas a decrease is 
not. In other words, Slovnaft increases the fuel price when Brent rises, but does not 
decrease when Brent falls. This behavior is in line with the public perception of the   16
asymmetric reaction of Slovnaft to the prices of Brent. However, a corresponding F-test 
was not able to reject hypotheses of symetricity. 
The third factor which, according to the above-mentioned Slovnaft statements, 
should have influence on fuel price is the gasoline price on the Commodity Exchange. The 
regression results confirmed this statement but only partially. Only negative price changes 
in gasoline have an influence on fuel. Increases in world prices of gasoline have no effect 
on Slovnaft fuel. Using an F-test I was able to reject hypotheses of symetricity. 
My last comment is that changes in input prices do not fully describe the behavior 
of the output price. The R squared is 0.65, which suggests that the price of fuel is also 
determined by other factors than input prices or in a different way than my specification 
(not linearly). 
Let me speculate a bit about the reasons for this price behavior. The company 
operates on large share of the Slovak fuel market. According to the Annual Report 2000, 
this share reached almost 50%. Though this number is high, there is still residual demand 
high enough that in case of significant decreases in world fuel prices, other companies 
would import this cheap fuel. Such a situation would mean a loss of market for Slovnaft, 
therefore Slovnaft has to react to decreases in world fuel prices. 
On the other hand, Slovnaft does not react to increases in world fuel prices. Other 
companies which sell fuel on the Slovak market has to import all their quantity, so their 
prices will reflect the world market to a larger extent than Slovnaft does. In the case of an 
increase of world fuel prices, these companies are forced to increase their prices as well. 
Slovnaft can gain additional market share by not increasing its own prices. This is, 
however, only a hypothesis, which cannot be confirmed or rejected.  
   17
Table 6 presents results from the estimation of the regression equation (3). Despite 
the multicollinearity problem, the results seem to be in line with expectations. The 
correlation of total input cost and the gasoline variable is around 0.8, which is quite high. 
Therefore I employ the ridge regression method. Both of these methods (OLS and ridge 
regression) produce similar results. Before takeover, the total input cost has a very small 
influence on the fuel price, whereas gasoline has none. On the other hand, after takeover, 
the total input cost and gasoline are significant variables in fuel price determination. The R 





Using a correlation matrix, Granger causality and running regressions I examined the links 
between the fuel price on the one side and the dollar, Brent crude oil and gasoline prices 
on the other side. I find that during the time when Slovnaft was owned and controlled by 
managers, only negative changes in input prices were reflected in the output price. 
Therefore, the increases in fuel price during that period have different reasons than the 
input price. From figure 2 we can see a gap between fuel prices and their composite input 
costs. This gap was widening prior to takeover, leaving space for lowering fuel prices after 
takeover. And actually, after takeover, we can identify different factors influencing the 
fuel price. As one of the most important factors I identify the price of the dollar in terms of 
the Slovak crown. The reaction of fuel to dollar changes is symmetric. The fuel price, 
however, reacts asymmetrically to the price of gasoline. In particular, fuel reacts to Brent 
increases and gasoline decreases. Moreover, the gap between input costs and the output 
price became lower than before. An R squared of 0.65 suggests that there is more behind   18
the fuel price evolution and further research is needed. Consecutive regression confirmed 
the hypothesis that before takeover the composite input costs have very little (or no) 
impact on fuel. After takeover, composite input costs as well as the Commodity Exchange 
fuel price (as an indicator of competitors’ prices) start to play an important role in price 
setting. Again, an R squared of 0.44 calls for further research. At the same time, 
examining the effects of takeovers of other petroleum factories (for example Polish POL) 
could bring interesting results. 
   19
REFERENCES  
 
Abdulai, A. and P. Rieder, 1999, “Using threshold cointegration to estimate asymmetric 
price transmission in the Swiss pork market”, Working Paper ETH, Zürich. 
 
Adrangi B, Chatrath A, Raffiee K, and R.D. Ripple, 2001, “Alaska North Slope crude oil 
price and the behavior of diesel prices in California”, Energy Economics 23: (1) 
29-42, Jan 2001. 
 
Amemiya, Takeshi, Advanced Econometrics, Harvard University Press, Cambrige, Mass., 
1985. 
 
Asplund, M., Eriksson, R., Friberg, R, 2000, “Price adjustments by a gasoline retail 
chain”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (1): 101-121. 
 
Bacon, Robert W., 1991, “Rockets and feathers: The asymmetric speed of adjustment of 
U.K. retail gasoline prices to cost changes”, Energy Economics 13 (July): 211-18.  
 
Bailey, D. and B.W. Brorsen, 1989, “Price asymmetry in spatial fed cattle markets”, 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 14: 246- 252. 
 
Bake, Brown and Yucel, 1996, “Crude oil and fuel prices: An asymmetric relationship? 
Economic Review”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, First Quarter 1996. 
 
Batten, Dallas S., and Daniel L. Thornon, 1983, “Lag-length selection criteria: Empirical 
results from the St. Louis equation”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research 
paper 83. 
 
Borenstein, S., Cameron, and A.C., Gilbert, 1997, “Do gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to crude oil price changes?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 
(1), Feb 1997. 
 
Contin I, A. Correlje, and E. Huerta, 1999, “The Spanish gasoline market: From ceiling 
regulation to open market pricing”, Energy Journal 20 (4): 1-14. 
 
Cramon-Taubadel, S. von and J. Meyer, 2000, “Asymmetric price transmission: Fact or 
artefact?", Diskussionsbeitrag 0002, Institut für Agrarökonomie, Göttingen. 
 
Eltony, M. N., 1998, “The asymmetry of gasoline prices: Fresh evidence from an error 
correction model for UK and USA”, International Journal of Energy Research 
22(3): 271-276, March 1998. 
 
Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger, 1987, “Cointegration and error correction: 
Representation, estimation and testing”, Econometrica 49: 251- 276. 
 
Hannan, E.J. and Quinn, 1979, “The determination of the order of an autoregression”, 
Journal of Royal Statistical Society B41: 190-195. 
   20
Harper, D.C. and B.K. Goodwin, 1999, “Price transmission, threshold behavior, and 
asymmetric adjustment in the U.S. pork sector”, Paper presented at the 1999 
AAEA Meetings in Nashville, May 14, 1999. 
 
Houck, P.J., 1977, “An approach to specifying and estimating nonreversible functions”, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59: 570- 572. 
 
Hsiao, Cheng., 1981, “Autoregressive modelling and money-income causality detection”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 7: 85-106, January 1981. 
 
Granger C. W. J., 1969, “Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-
spectral methods”, Econometrica 37(3): 424-38, July 1969. 
 
Granger, C.W.J. and T. - H. Lee, 1989, “Investigation of production, sales and inventory 
relationships using multicointegration and non- symmetric error correction 
models”, Journal of Applied Econometrics 4: 145- 159. 
 
Kočenda, E., 2001, “Macroeconomic convergence in transition countries”, Journal of 
Comparative Economies 29: 1-23. 
 
Kočenda E., 1998, Exchange Rate in Transition, CERGE Charles University, ISBN 80-
86286-08-8. 
 
Mohanty, S., Peterson, E.W.F. and N.C. Kruse, 1995, “Price asymmetry in the 
international wheat market”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 43: 355- 
366. 
 
National Bank of Slovakia, www.nbs.sk, accessed in May 2001. 
 
Quinn, B.G., 1980, “Order determination for a multivariate autoregression”, Journal of 
Royal Statistical Society B42: 182-185. 
 
Peltzman, S, 2000, “Prices rise faster than they fall”, Journal of Political Economy 108 
(3), June 2000. 
 
Sclove, S.L., “Least squares problem with random regression coefficients”, Technical 
Report No.87, IMSSS, Stanford University, 1973. 
 
Slovnaft, 2000a, “Kto hýbe cenou motorových palív [Who moves with fuel prices]”, 
Slovnaft official statement, http://www.slovnaft.sk/, accessed in May 2001, March 
30. 2000. 
 
Slovnaft, 2000b, “Zvýšenie cien motorových palív [Increase in prices of fuel]”, Slovnaft 
official statement, www.slovnaft.sk, accessed in May 2001, September 5, 2000.  21
TABLE 1 
Shareholder structure of Slovnaft to May 31, 2000. 
 
Shareholder STAKE %
MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Public Ltd  36.22
Slovintegra, a. s.  28.67
The Bank of New York  8.39
Fund of National Property  7.98





Summary statistics for the examined time series. 
 
Num. of 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 
Changes in Dollar (whole period)  114 0.002  0.016  -0.043  0.065 
Changes in Dollar (before takeover)  39 0.004  0.019  -0.043  0.065 
Changes in Dollar (after takeover)  74 0.001  0.014  -0.030  0.033 
Changes in Fuel (whole period)  114 0.003  0.020  -0.064  0.075 
Changes in Fuel (before takeover)  39 0.009  0.020  -0.038  0.075 
Changes in Fuel (after takeover)  74 -0.001 0.019  -0.064  0.031 
Changes in Brent (whole period)  114 0.007  0.038  -0.094  0.216 
Changes in Brent (before takeover)  39 0.020  0.044  -0.048  0.216 
Changes in Brent (after takeover)  74 0.001  0.033  -0.094  0.071 
Changes in Gasoline (whole period)  114 0.007  0.060  -0.151  0.291 
Changes in Gasoline (before takeover)  39 0.024  0.058  -0.060  0.291 






Cumulative change in the price of fuel, the dollar, Brent and gasoline price:  








Changes in Fuel   0.294  0.374  -0.080 
Changes in Dollar  0.263 0.167 0.096 
Changes in Brent  0.841 0.781 0.060 












Correlations of daily changes (and their lagged values):  
























Change in fuel  1  0.392 0.222 0.454 0.199 0.595  0.188  0.661 
Lagged change in fuel  -0.159  1  0.027 0.228 0.190 0.207  0.035  0.190 
Change in dollar  -0.089  -0.343  1  0.365 0.225 0.242  0.135  0.118 
Lagged change in dollar  0.253  -0.112  0.312  1  -0.002 0.216 -0.158  0.136 
Change in Brent  -0.044  0.048  0.425  0.366  1  0.304 0.535 0.216 
Lagged change in Brent  0.160  -0.060  0.012  0.386  0.028  1  0.097 0.528 
Change in Gasoline         1  0.197 
Lagged change in Gasoline           1 
Note: I use a notation similar to Kočenda (2001). The table’s lower left portion contains correlation 







Granger causality: price of fuel, the dollar, Brent and gasoline.  
Time span: before and after takeover . 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 Before takeover           TABLE 4.2 After takeover 
 Fuel  Dollar  Brent      Fuel  Dollar  Brent  Gasoline 
Fuel   
B     Fuel         
Dollar         Dollar  
A      
Brent         Brent  
A      
         Gasoline       
 
Note: I use a notation similar to Kočenda (1998). A and B denote significance at the 1% level, and the 










TABLE  5 
Regression of changes of fuel on changes in the dollar and Brent 
 








+ 0.072 -0.121   0.375 B 
(0.165) (0.172)   (0.167)  
Lagged Dollar
  -0.665 A  -0.867 B  -0.471 B 
(0.172) (0.359)   (0.205)  
Lagged Brent
+  0.053 -0.072   0.244 A 
(0.065) (0.123)   (0.084)  
Lagged Brent
-  -0.214 A  -0.961 A  -0.082  
(0.08) (0.253)   (0.075)  
Lagged Gasoline
+  -0.012 0.044   0.055  
(0.047) (0.096)   (0.051)  
Lagged Gasoline
  -0.234
A  0.230   -0.217 A 
  (0.038) (0.181)   (0.037)  
Constant 0.011 0.0175   0.0006  
Hypothesis H0 4.31 **  4.86 **  0.09 
 
Hypothesis H1 2.19   10.32 ***  1.88 
 
Hypothesis H2 14.62 ***  1.57   5.57 
** 
R-square 0.468 0.324 0.656 
 
Num.of Obs.  114 39 75   
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis 
A and B denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
**  and *** denote that I reject the hypothesis at 5 and 10% percent level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE  6 
Regression of changes in fuel price on changes in Total Input Costs and Gasoline prices 
 


















Lagged Gasoline 2 0.136
A  0.136
A 
  (0.027) (0.034)
Takeover Dummy  -0.009
B  -0.009
A 




  (0.004) (0.003)
R-square 0.415 0.439
Number of Obs.  114 114
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. A, B, and C denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. TIC stands for Total Input Costs.   24
 
FIGURE 1 


















































































































Fuel price in SKK (right axis)
























































































































Fuel price in SKK (left axis)
Input cost - barrel per SKK
(right axis)
Takeover